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Abstract This note characterizes the optimal base for commodity taxation
in the presence of administrative fixed costs varying across goods. For low tax
rates, the optimal base only comprises commodities whose discouragement
index is greater than the ratio of their administrative costs to the tax they
yield. An illustration with UK data shows that a category of goods should
be taxed only if the revenue generated on this category is at least ten times
greater than its administrative fixed cost. The cost imputable to the category
of goods taxed at the standard rate would be at most 6 percent of total VAT
revenue. The administration cost associated with categories of goods currently
tax free could justify exemption.
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1 Introduction
The theory of optimal taxation focuses on the excess burden of taxation as
the main source of the social loss caused by taxation. The empirical evidence
however suggests that the administrative costs required to collect taxes may
be substantial (Slemrod (1991)). Most measures of such costs are based on
staff salary or equipment costs, but little is known about their true underlying
determinants and precise shape (Shaw et al (2010)). Polinsky and Shavell
(1984), Kaplow (1990) and Mayshar (1991) have derived optimal tax rules
when the administrative cost function displays usual continuity and convexity
properties with respect to the level of tax rates. Still, as argued by Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (1996) and Alm (1996), it is likely that this function exhibits
significant discontinuities and/or nonconvexities.
Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989) have given early insights into the op-
timal indirect taxes when these discontinuities are due to idiosyncratic fixed
costs varying across commodities. A minimum number of employees may be
required for performing the administration of taxed goods. Otherwise, no tax
would be recovered because of, e.g., tax evasion and black market operations.
The tax authority then faces two alternatives: a category of goods can be either
taxed, in which case the tax authority must bear some specific administration
fixed cost, or this category can remain tax free. The characterization of the tax
base therefore involves a discrete choice between taxation and exemption. In
a simple Cobb-Douglas partial equilibrium economy with one representative
consumer and uniform commodity taxation, Yitzhaki (1979) has shown that
this choice relies on price sensitivity of demand, as is usual in a Ramsey setup,
and also on the level of the demand. The tax base actually comprises all the
goods with a low enough ratio of administrative cost to the amount of tax
they yield. Hereafter this ratio will be referred to as the ‘Yitzhaki ratio.’
This note generalizes the papers of Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989) in
three directions: (i) optimal tax rates possibly differ across goods; (ii) house-
holds have heterogeneous preferences with respect to consumption and labor;
(iii) the social planner has a redistributive objective. This generalization is
made possible by considering a new problem which does not directly refer to
the discrete choice between taxation and exemption, but instead the continu-
ous choice of the probability that a category of similar goods will be subject to
taxation. The optimal choice of this probability can be treated by appealing
to the usual Lagrangian method, which enables us to compare solutions where
the category is either taxed or exempted.
This construction yields a general rule for including a good in the tax base.
This rule takes a very simple form in the particular case of low tax rates: a
good must be included in the tax base only if its associated Mirrlees (1976)
discouragement index is higher than its Yitzhaki ratio. Thus the influence of
equity on the decision to tax only transits through the optimal levels of tax
rates: a good whose demand should not be strongly discouraged, because it is
consumed by agents whose social value is high, is less likely to be taxed.
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An empirical illustration on UK data suggests that a category of goods
should be taxed only if the revenue generated on this category is at least ten
times greater than its administrative fixed cost. Currently untaxed categories
of goods may fail to satisfy this requirement, which could justify exemption.
The illustration also gives upper bounds for the ratio of administrative fixed
costs to total VAT revenue. The highest bounds apply to the categories ‘House-
hold Goods and Services’, ‘Petrol and Diesel’, ‘Tobacco’ and ‘Leisure Services’.
The administrative cost imputable to the whole category of goods taxed at
the standard rate would be at most 6 per cent of total VAT revenue.
2 The setup
The economy consists of a tax authority, a continuum of heterogeneous house-
holds h ∈ H, and a continuum of categories of consumption goods i ∈ C
produced from labor provided by households. The tax authority raises a given
amount of revenue R by using linear taxes on consumption goods. In the Ram-
sey approach the tax authority first sets the tax rates ti applying to goods in
category i, and then households choose how much to consume and how much
to work, considering as given the various tax rates.
We proceed backward and begin with the study of households’ behavior.
This behavior will act as a constraint in the problem of the tax authority.
The preferences of household h are represented by a utility function which is
separable across consumption goods and labor,∫
C
uhi (x
h
i )dµi − `h, (1)
where µ is a non-atomic measure which captures the importance of the different
categories of goods.
The problem of household h consists in choosing a bundle (xhi ) and a labor
supply `h which maximize her utility (1) subject to the budget constraint∫
C
(1 + ti)x
h
i dµi ≤ `h. (2)
Consumption goods are produced from labor according to a linear technology
normalized so that producer prices equal 1, and thus 1 + ti is the consumer
price of goods in category i. The demand function solution to the problem of
maximizing (1) subject to (2) is xhi = ξ
h
i (ti) for every i ∈ C. Indirect utility is∫
C
(
uhi (ξ
h
i (ti))− (1 + ti)ξhi (ti)
)
dµi ≡
∫
C
vhi (ti)dµi.
The contribution of category i goods to the welfare of household h can therefore
be measured by vhi (ti).
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Some of the arguments used in section 3 to characterize the composition of
the tax base rely on the assumption that utility is derived from a continuum
of goods (see Remark 1). The modeling assumption that goods differ continu-
ously with some characteristics may not fully accord with the formulation (1),
since a tax rate placed on good i is likely to cause substitution into almost
identical neighboring goods. Section 4 considers a general utility function, with
a continuum of consumption goods, allowing for cross-price and income effects.
It shows that the simple formulation (1) actually provides the main insights.
3 The decision to tax
Following Yitzhaki (1979), the tax authority must pay a fixed cost ci when it
decides to tax (or subsidize) commodity i. Otherwise, this commodity remains
tax free. The tax authority thus chooses both the tax rates applying to taxed
commodities and the composition of the tax base.
Whether a commodity should be taxed or exempted is a discrete decision
to which the standard Lagrangian method does not directly apply. It can be
treated as a continuous decision by proceeding as if it were possible to tax
commodities randomly. Suppose that commodity i is taxed at rate ti with
probability pii (0 ≤ pii ≤ 1) and exempted otherwise. When this commodity is
taxed, household h gets indirect utility vhi (ti) and pays the tax tiξ
h
i (ti) while
the authority bears the administration cost ci. When it is tax free, household
h indirect utility is vhi (0).
The problem of the tax authority is to select ti and pii for every i ∈ C. Let
the measure ν stand for the distribution of households, and let γh be the social
valuation of the welfare of household h. At the optimum, the profile (ti, pii)
maximizes ∫
H
γh
∫
C
piiv
h
i (ti)dµi +
∫
C
(1− pii)vhi (0)dµi
 dνh (3)
subject to the budget constraint∫
C
pii
ti ∫
H
ξhi (ti) dν
h − ci
 dµi ≥ R (λ) (4)
and for every i ∈ C,
pii ≥ 0, (ρi)
pii ≤ 1. (σi)
The variables in brackets are the associated Lagrange multipliers.
Using the Lagrangian approach, a first-order (necessary) condition for pii
to be a maximum is∫
H
(
γh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
+ λ
(
tiξ
h
i (ti)− ci
))
dνh + ρi − σi = 0. (5)
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In addition, the Kuhn and Tucker exclusion conditions must be satisfied,
ρi ≥ 0, ρipii = 0, (6)
σi ≥ 0, σi(1− pii) = 0. (7)
Let
Li(ti, λ) ≡
∫
H
γhvhi (ti)dν
h + λti
∫
H
ξhi (ti)dν
h
stand for the contribution of commodity i to social welfare (net of its associated
administrative costs). The first-order conditions (5), (6) and (7) directly yield
the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume that commodity i is taxed (or subsidized) at some
arbitrary rate ti when it belongs to the tax base. A necessary condition for
commodity i to belong to the tax base is Li(ti, λ) − Li(0, λ) ≥ λci, or equiva-
lently ∫
H
βh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
dνh + ti
∫
H
ξhi (ti)dν
h ≥ ci, (8)
where βh ≡ γh/λ is the marginal social valuation of the income of household
h.
Similarly, a necessary condition for commodity i to be tax free is Li(ti, λ)−
Li(0, λ) ≤ λci, or equivalently∫
H
βh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
dνh + ti
∫
H
ξhi (ti)dν
h ≤ ci. (9)
In the second stage described in Section 2 households will be faced with the
situation where commodity i is either exempted (pii = 0) or taxed (pii = 1).
The relevant solutions must therefore be such that pii ∈ {0, 1}. There is in fact
no loss in focusing attention on this type of solutions in Proposition 1. This is
clear when inequality (8) or (9) is strict. This is also clear when there is only
one non-atomic commodity for which (8) holds at equality, since setting the
probability on that commodity to either 0 or 1 can then be done without any
further implications.
In the remaining case where there is an atomic group of commodities for
which (8) holds at equality, and pii /∈ {0, 1} for some of these commodities, it is
always possible to split this group into two (atomic) subgroups, one consisting
of taxed commodities and the other consisting of exempted commodities, such
that both the budget constraint and the social objective are unaffected. To
see this, suppose that (8) holds at equality for every commodity in an atomic
group I ⊆ C, i.e.,
∫
H
γh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
dνh = −λ
ti ∫
H
ξhi (ti)dν
h − ci
 (10)
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for all i ∈ I, µ(I) > 0. Consider any interval I = [iinf , isup] ⊆ I, and suppose
that pii 6= {0, 1} for some i ∈ I. Let RI be the amount collected from I. There
is then a new profile (pi∗i ), pi
∗
i ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ I, such that the profiles
(pii) and (pi
∗
i ) yield the same amount RI of collected tax,∫
I
pii
ti ∫
H
ξhi (ti) dν
h − ci
 dµi = ∫
I
pi∗i
ti ∫
H
ξhi (ti) dν
h − ci
 dµi. (11)
Indeed, the function
G(i) =
∫ isup
i
ti ∫
H
ξhi (ti) dν
h − ci
 dµi
is continuous with i, i ∈ [iinf , isup], when the measure µ is non-atomic. Since
G(iinf) ≥ RI and G(isup) = 0, it follows from the intermediate value theorem
that there is at least one i ∈ I such that G(i) = RI . By (10), G(i) is decreasing,
so that such a i is in fact unique. Proceeding similarly for every interval in I
yields a profile (pi∗i ), pi
∗
i ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ I, allowing to collect the same
amount of tax from I as the initial profile (pii). Finally, using (10), (11), and
again (10) shows that the value of the social objective is also the same with
both profiles,∫
I
∫
H
γhvhi (0)dν
h + pi∗i
∫
H
γh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
dνh
dµi
=
∫
I
∫
H
γhvhi (0)dν
h + pii
∫
H
γh
(
vhi (ti)− vhi (0)
)
dνh
 dµi.
Remark 1 The existence of a solution where pii ∈ {0, 1} for every good relies
on the measure µ. When this measure is non-atomic, the previous argument
shows that there may exist several solutions where pii ∈ [0, 1] for every good,
but there is always one solution where every good is either taxed or exempted.
When the measure µ has atoms, e.g., in the discrete good version of this model,
the function G used above is no longer continuous. Then it may not be possible
to find a solution pii ∈ {0, 1} for every good.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal tax base associated with arbitrary
tax rates, not necessarily those chosen by the government to maximize social
welfare. An optimal tax rate t∗i on commodity i is an extremum of Li(ti, λ).
It satisfies the first-order condition
−d∗i ≡
∫
H
t∗i
ξi(t∗i )
∂ξhi
∂ti
(t∗i )dν
h = − ((1− β)− βφ∗i ) , (12)
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Fig. 1 The tax base in
the Cobb-Douglas case
with
β ≡
∫
H
βhdνh, ξi(t
∗
i ) ≡
∫
H
ξhi (t
∗
i )dν
h, φ∗i ≡ cov
(
βh
β
,
ξhi (t
∗
i )
ξi(t∗i )
)
.
This is the familiar many-person Ramsey formula. At the optimum, the Mir-
rlees’ (1976) discouragement index d∗i equals a constant plus an equity correc-
tion varying with the commodity.
In an optimal indirect tax structure, the tax base comprises goods satisfy-
ing (8), the tax rates (t∗i ) satisfy (12) and the marginal social cost of public
funds λ is determined by the budget constraint (4) of the tax authority.
In order to describe how the composition of the tax base described in
Proposition 1 and the Ramsey rule (12) interact, consider for instance the
particular case where preferences over consumption goods are represented by
a Cobb-Douglas utility function, uhi (x
h
i ) = α
h
i log x
h
i for every h, i (whereas the
contribution of leisure to utility remains a linear function of its consumption).
Appealing to the Ramsey rule,∫
H
αhi dν
h = (1 + t∗i )
∫
H
βhαhi dν
h,
inequality (8) becomes
t∗i − log (1 + t∗i )
1 + t∗i
≥ ci∫
H
αhi dν
h
. (13)
In the representative agent case considered by Yitzhaki (1979), αhi = αi what-
ever h and i are, so that the Ramsey tax rate is uniform and the tax base
consists of all the goods whose ci/αi ratio is low enough.
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Figure 1 illustrates how the optimal tax base is determined in the presence
of heterogeneity across households. The LHS of (13) is the U-shaped function
of the tax rate, with a global minimum at t∗i = 0. When satisfied at equality,
(13) typically yields two thresholds tinfi and t
sup
i (t
inf
i < 0 < t
sup
i ). Commodity
i should be tax free only if tinfi ≤ t∗i ≤ tsupi , and it should enter the tax base
only if either t∗i ≥ tsupi or t∗i ≤ tinfi .
Inequality (13) shows that, in the Cobb-Douglas case, heterogeneity across
households and equity considerations influence the composition of the tax base
through the Ramsey tax rates only. This property extends to more general
preferences satisfying (1) in the empirically plausible configuration of low rates
of tax, i.e., when t∗i is close enough to 0 for every i ∈ C.
Proposition 2 Assume that commodity i is taxed at a low Ramsey tax rate
t∗i when it belongs to the tax base. It should be included in the tax base only if
its associated discouragement index is greater than its Yitzhaki ratio, i.e.,
|d∗i | ≥
ci
|t∗i | ξi(0)
.
Proof Appealing to Roy’s identity, the first-order Taylor expansion of Li(t∗i , λ)
at t∗i = 0 yields
Li(t∗i , λ) ' Li(0, λ) + λt∗i ξi(0)
1− ∫
H
βh
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
dνh
 . (14)
The tax rate t∗i is given by (12), which can be rewritten as
d∗i = 1−
∫
H
βh
ξhi (t
∗
i )
ξi(t∗i )
dνh. (15)
For low tax rates, t∗i ' 0 for every i ∈ C,∫
H
βh
ξhi (t
∗
i )
ξi(t∗i )
dνh '
∫
H
βh
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
dνh + t∗i
∫
H
∂
∂t∗i
(
βh
ξhi (t
∗
i )
ξi(t∗i )
)∣∣∣∣
t∗i=0
dνh,
so that (15) yields
1−
∫
H
βh
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
dνh ' d∗i + t∗i
∫
H
∂
∂t∗i
(
βh
ξhi (t
∗
i )
ξi(t∗i )
)∣∣∣∣
t∗i=0
dνh.
Reintroducing this expression into (14), and neglecting the higher order term
in t∗2i , one gets
Li(t∗i , λ) ' Li(0, λ) + λt∗i ξi(0)d∗i . (16)
The result then follows from Proposition 1.
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Proposition 2 gives a simple picture of the optimal tax base. Assume for
instance that the Ramsey tax rate t∗i is positive. Then, commodity i is more
likely to be exempted whenever (a) it is costly to administrate (ci is high),
(b) it yields a low amount of taxes (t∗i ξi(0) is low), and (c) its demand should
not be strongly discouraged (d∗i > 0 is low), i.e., the efficiency cost induced
by taxation of commodity i is high (β is high) and this good is consumed by
households with high social value (φ∗i is positive).
4 An empirical illustration
The method used in Sections 2 and 3 can be adapted to characterize the tax
base in the presence of cross-price and income effects. Let the preferences of
household h be represented by a general utility function uh(x, `) with usual
monotony and convexity properties. When this household is faced with tax
rate ti = {0, t∗i } on commodity i, her budget constraint is∫
C
(1 + ti)x
h
i dµi ≤ `h.
The demand function of household h for good i is ξhi (t) and her labor supply is
`h(t), where t = (ti) denotes the whole vector of tax rates. Her indirect utility
is vh(t).
As in Section 3 we assume that the tax rate ti is set according to a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter pii (0 ≤ pii ≤ 1). Social welfare then can be ex-
pressed as ∫
H
γhEt
[
vh(t)
]
dνh (17)
and the social budget constraint is∫
H
Et
∫
C
tiξ
h
i (t)dµi
dνh − ∫
C
piicidµi ≥ R. (18)
The optimal indirect tax structure is a profile (t∗i , pi
∗
i ) which maximizes (17)
subject to (18) and the constraints 0 ≤ pii ≤ 1 for every i ∈ C. When the
optimal tax rates are low enough, it is shown in appendix that commodity i
should be included in the tax base, i.e., pi∗i = 1, only if1− ∫
H
βh
ξhi (0)
ξi(0)
dνh
 t∗i ' d∗i t∗i ≥ ciξi(0) , (19)
where βh = αhγh/λ, and αh is the marginal utility of income of household
h. This generalizes the inequality given in Proposition 2 for a utility function
for which the derived demands are income sensitive and for which there are
cross-price effects.
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Inequality (19) can be used to get bounds for actual administrative costs.
Appealing to UK data from the Institute of Fiscal Studies, goods are grouped
in twenty homogeneous discrete categories of goods reported in Table 1. Ap-
proximating integration to summation, the necessary condition (19) will be
applied to these categories of goods. All the goods in a category are taxed at
the same rate (except for goods subject to excises). Belan et al (2008) recov-
ered from these data a marginal social cost of public funds λ equal to 1.11, and
a poorly redistributive VAT with α1γ1 = 0.03, α4γ4 = 0.54 and α5γ5 = 0.43,
while αhγh = 0 for all the other deciles of consumption expenditures. The bud-
get shares by decile for these categories then enable us to compute the actual
discouragement indices (applying to uncompensated demand) which appear in
the LHS of inequality (19). They are reported in the second column of Table
1, with the shares of VAT from each category in the total revenue (in the third
column).
The quantities in (19) are evaluated at t = 0 since the rule (19) has been
obtained under the assumption that the tax rates are close to 0. On the other
hand, the computation of the discouragement indices is made using the actual
(observed) VAT structure, with some goods being taxed. This computation
is therefore valid provided that the quantities in (19) are not too sensitive to
changes in the tax rates. With this caveat in mind, each index is found positive
and close to 0.1. Hence, by (19), a category will be taxed only if the tax it
yields is at least ten times greater than its fixed administrative cost.
Existing empirical evidence suggests that total VAT administrative costs,
i.e., including variable costs but excluding possible compliance costs, would be
around 1 or 2 percent of total VAT revenue in the UK (Sandford et al (1989);
Bickley (2003); Evans (2003)). In order to check whether these estimates are
consistent with those obtained from (19), inequality (19) is expressed in share
of total VAT revenue,
t∗kξk(0)∫
C
t∗i ξi(0)dµi
d∗k ≥
ck∫
C
t∗i ξi(0)dµi
(20)
for every category k. Assuming that the actual (observed) demand is given by
ξi(t
∗
i ) and can be evaluated as if the various tax rates were zero, the observed
share of VAT from every taxed category in total VAT revenue appears in the
LHS of inequality (20), while the RHS gives the actual ratio of administrative
fixed costs to total VAT revenue. The product of the share of VAT from every
taxed category in total revenue and the discouragement index of the category
thus provides an upper bound for the ratio of administrative fixed costs to
total VAT revenue. These upper bounds for the ratio of administrative fixed
costs to total VAT revenue are reported in the fourth column of Table 1. Their
highest values stand between 1% and 2% of total VAT revenue. They apply to
four categories (‘Tobacco’, ‘Petrol and Diesel’, ‘Household Goods and Services’,
and ‘Leisure Services’). Otherwise the administrative fixed costs seem low, e.g.,
those relative to ‘Public Transport’ do not exceed 0.2% of total VAT revenue,
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that is
0.002 ≥ ck∫
C
t∗i ξi(0)dµi
for k = ‘Public Transport.’ An upper bound for the ratio of total administrative
fixed cost to total VAT revenue∫
T
ck∫
C
t∗i ξi(0)dµi
can be found by summation of the bounds for the individual taxed goods. The
fixed cost imputable to the whole category of goods taxed at the standard
rate would be at most 5% and 6% of total revenue. These upper bounds on
administrative fixed costs are above the existing estimates of the total admin-
istrative costs, and they have approximately the same order of magnitude as
these estimates. One may therefore conclude that the results derived from (19)
are roughly consistent with the existing UK estimates.
Finally one can also get an idea about the costs attached to untaxed cate-
gories by considering what would happen if the optimal rate on these categories
were the reduced rate of VAT of 5%. The fifth column of Table 1 reports the
corresponding bounds for administrative fixed costs, postulating no reaction
of demand. These bounds can be viewed as lower bounds for the ratio of ad-
ministrative costs of untaxed categories to total VAT revenue. These bounds
seem low, about 0.1 or 0.2% of total revenue. In comparison with the actual
administrative costs found in the literature, it seems therefore possible that
these categories should remain tax free, partly because of relatively high fixed
administrative costs.
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tk dk
tkξk∫
C
tiξidµi
tkξk∫
C
tiξidµi
dk
t˜kξk∫
C
t˜iξidµi
dk
Untaxed
Meat & Fish 0 0.0899 0 – 0.0023
Bread & Cereals 0 0.0901 0 – 0.0007
Dairy 0 0.0900 0 – 0.0015
Tea & Coffee 0 0.0901 0 – 0.0004
Fruits and Vegetables 0 0.0902 0 – 0.0014
Other Untax. Foods 0 0.0903 0 – 0.001
Books & Newspapers 0 0.0905 0 – 0.0006
Children’s Clothing 0 0.0907 0 – 0.0003
Reduced rate
Domestic Fuels 0.05 0.0900 0.0356 0.0032 –
Excises –
Tobacco 0.791 0.0890 0.1379 0.012 –
Beer 0.28 0.0904 0.0634 0.0057 –
Petrol and Diesel 0.732 0.0908 0.1465 0.0133 –
Wine & Spirits 0.558 0.0913 0.0538 0.0049 –
Standard rate –
Public Transport 0.175 0.0903 0.0211 0.0019 –
Standard VAT Food 0.175 0.0904 0.0381 0.0034 –
Food out 0.175 0.0919 0.0590 0.0054 –
Household G & S 0.175 0.0912 0.2005 0.0182 –
Adult Clothing 0.175 0.0914 0.0806 0.0073 –
Leisure Goods 0.175 0.0926 0.0508 0.0047 –
Leisure Services 0.175 0.0931 0.1101 0.010 –
Table 1 UK VAT base with administrative fixed costs
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Appendix
This appendix provides an explicit derivation of inequality (19). Let T be
the set of all taxed commodities, i.e., ti 6= 0 for every i ∈ T , and ti = 0
otherwise (i ∈ C\T ). The optimal tax rate t∗k on commodity k is an extremum
of the Lagrangian function∫
H
γhvhdνh + λ
∫
H
∫
T
(
tiξ
h
i − ci
)
dµidν
h − λR,
where vh and ξhi are evaluated at (t). The first-order condition in tk writes
d∗k ≡ −
∫
H
∫
T
ti
ξk
∂ξhi
∂tk
dµidν
h =
∫
H
(
1−γ
hαh
λ
)
ξhk
ξk
dνh
where ξk is the aggregate consumption of good k, α
h is the marginal utility
of income for household h, and d∗k is the discouragement index for category k.
All these quantities are evaluated at (t∗). Note that, unlike the usual formu-
lation, the discouragement indices refer to uncompensated demand (and not
compensated demand) in order to be used in the empirical illustration. The
optimal tax rate on good k satisfies
d∗k = 1−
∫
H
βh
ξhk (t)
ξk(t)
dνh ' 1−
∫
H
βh
ξhk (0)
ξk(0)
dνh +
∫
T
t∗i
∂d∗k
∂ti
∣∣∣∣
t∗i=0
dµi, (21)
where the approximation is obtained by assuming low tax rates.
Let ti = {0, t∗i } and assume that ti ∼ t∗i × B(pii), where B(pii) stands for
the Bernoulli distribution with parameter pii. In order to derive the first-order
condition associated with the inclusion of commodity k in the tax base, we let
t = (tk, t−k) where t−k is the set of all the tax rates different from tk. The
social welfare becomes
pikEt−k
∫
H
γhvh(t∗k, t−k)dν
h
+ (1− pik)Et−k
∫
H
γhvh(0, t−k)dνh
 ,
while the total receipt from commodity taxation is
pikEt−k
t∗k ∫
H
ξhk (t
∗
k, t−k)dµkdν
h +
∫
H
∫
C\{k}
tiξ
h
i (t
∗
k, t−k)dµidν
h

+ (1− pik)Et−k
∫
H
∫
C\{k}
tiξ
h
i (0, t−k)dµidν
h
 .
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Let also
Lk(t∗k, λ) =
∫
H
γhEt−k
[
vh(t∗k, t−k)
]
dνh
+ λEt−k
∫
H
t∗kξ
h
k (t
∗
k, t−k)dµkdν
h +
∫
H
∫
C\{k}
tiξ
h
i (t
∗
k, t−k)dµidν
h
 .
By the same argument as the one used to get Proposition 1, commodity k
should be included in the tax base only if
Lk(t∗k, λ)− Lk(0, λ)− λck ≥ 0. (22)
For low tax rates, i.e., t∗i close to 0, Roy’s identity yields
vh(t∗k, t−k) ' vh −
∫
T
t∗iα
hξhi dµi
where quantities are evaluated at (t∗k, t−k) = (0, 0). Therefore, at this point,
Lk(t∗k, λ) '
∫
H
γh
vh − ∫
T
t∗iα
hξhi dµi
 dνh + λ ∫
H
∫
T
t∗i ξ
h
i dµidν
h.
Similarly,
Lk(0, λ) '
∫
H
γh
vh − ∫
T \{k}
t∗iα
hξhi dµi
 dνh + λ ∫
H
∫
T \{k}
t∗i ξ
h
i dµidν
h.
The last two expressions only differ with respect to the inclusion of commodity
k in the tax base. This commodity belongs to the tax base T in Lk(t∗k, λ), but
it is not in T (in fact it belongs to T \{k}) in Lk(0, λ). It follows that
Lk(t∗k, λ)− Lk(0, λ) '
∫
H
(
λ− γhαh) t∗kξhkdνh = λt∗kξk
1− ∫
H
βh
ξhk
ξk
dνh
 .
Appealing to (21), this approximation rewrites
Lk(t∗k, λ)− Lk(0, λ) ' λt∗kξk
d∗k − ∫
T
t∗i
∂d∗k
∂ti
dµi
 ' λt∗kξkd∗k (23)
where the last approximation is obtained by neglecting the higher order terms
in t∗kt
∗
i . Inequality (19) then comes from (22) and (23).
